Poland / 2026-09-23-pl-3
/ date of the event
A fire broke out at the Starlink ground station in Wola Krobowska on the evening of 23 September 2026. On 25 September, Poland’s National Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation into sabotage, a terrorism-related offence and acting for a foreign intelligence service. Spokesperson Przemysław Nowak cited reasonable suspicion that the perpetrators acted on orders from Russian services. This was the prosecutor’s official suspicion on 25 September. On 12 October, Poland’s interior ministry confirmed the arrest in Germany of two Turkish nationals suspected of the 23 September arson. Wanted notices and European Arrest Warrants had been issued the previous week. Minister Tomasz Siemoniak officially attributed the sabotage to Russian services. This is official state attribution, not a verdict against the detainees or identification of a particular Russian service. The entry does not establish destruction of the entire station or a service outage in Ukraine. The map point approximately represents the Wola Krobowska area, not the exact fire site. According to SWR, citing Stuttgart’s general public prosecutor, the court in Nürtingen opened the Polish European Arrest Warrants on 13 October and ordered that the two suspects remain in custody. This is not a sabotage conviction or confirmation of completed extradition. In its 14 October, 14:01 update, SWR cited the general public prosecutor as saying police measures involving a woman in Karlsruhe were not an arrest. Earlier reports of four arrests remain unconfirmed in that respect. The account of a possible driver arrested in Berlin originated with BILD; a final total arrest count is not established. On 16 October, ABW confirmed that two masked people deliberately set fire to control equipment. Firefighting lasted over six hours, which does not establish a service-outage duration. Charges against two suspects were formulated on 7 October and EAWs issued on 10 October; arrests in Germany took place on 12 October and German remand on 13 October. Transfer to Poland remains in progress. Evidence-gathering measures concerning two further people do not confirm their arrest. ABW also disclosed a separately detained person independently reconnoitring the station, remanded for three months from 30 September. This does not establish a third arsonist. The statement describes investigation of possible commissioning parties; it neither replaces the minister’s earlier attribution nor constitutes a verdict. Der Spiegel on 17 October, according to the complete reports in The Insider and Euronews, raised possible involvement of the Turkish Daltons/Daltonlar group: the two detainees reportedly belonged to the group or acted on its instructions. This is a journalistic lead about intermediaries, not new arrests or a court finding. Both reports rely on the same material and are not independent confirmations. The earlier official attribution to Russian services remains a separate basis; the newly described commissioning chain is not officially confirmed. Conflicting secondary reports of three or four arrests in the arson case were not adopted. On 29 October, Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau deputy head Saulius Briginas described direct links between people and Starlink incidents in Poland, Bulgaria and Lithuania. He said the Polish perpetrators were different from the two suspects in the Lithuanian and Bulgarian cases. His reference to at least four detainees in the Polish strand is a Lithuanian official’s account, without clarification of identities or the scope of detention. It does not replace the earlier Polish-German chronology or turn measures involving the woman in Karlsruhe into a confirmed arrest. The existing state attribution of the Polish sabotage remains a separate basis and does not automatically attribute the other two acts.
officially attributed
A court or a competent state body has attributed it. That is not the same as a proven attack: an indictment is an allegation, not a verdict.
Named party: Russian intelligence services
B - official attribution by a state body
Prokuratura Krajowa, rzecznik Przemysław Nowak / 2026-09-25 / carrying out the act
The prosecutor’s spokesperson cited reasonable suspicion that the perpetrators acted on Russian services’ orders; the investigation concerns sabotage and acting for a foreign intelligence service.
Minister Tomasz Siemoniak, komunikat MSWiA / 2026-10-12 / carrying out the act
Minister Tomasz Siemoniak officially attributed the sabotage to Russian services. The statement does not identify the GRU and is not a verdict against the two detained suspects.
Der Spiegel, według relacji The Insider i Euronews / 2026-10-17 / carrying out the act
Suspicion that the two detainees belonged to the Turkish Daltons/Daltonlar group or acted on its instructions. This new detail concerning intermediaries is not an official court or intelligence-service finding.
Reports of four arrests differ from SWR’s 14 October correction: Karlsruhe involved police measures rather than an arrest. Media versions were not added together.
On 12 October, Poland’s interior ministry confirmed the arrest in Germany of two Turkish nationals suspected of the 23 September arson. Wanted notices and European Arrest Warrants had been issued the previous week. Minister Tomasz Siemoniak officially attributed the sabotage to Russian services. This is official state attribution, not a verdict against the detainees or identification of a particular Russian service.
According to SWR, citing Stuttgart’s general public prosecutor, the court in Nürtingen opened the Polish European Arrest Warrants on 13 October and ordered that the two suspects remain in custody. This is not a sabotage conviction or confirmation of completed extradition.
In its 14 October, 14:01 update, SWR cited the general public prosecutor as saying police measures involving a woman in Karlsruhe were not an arrest. Earlier reports of four arrests remain unconfirmed in that respect. The account of a possible driver arrested in Berlin originated with BILD; a final total arrest count is not established.
On 16 October, ABW confirmed that two masked people deliberately set fire to control equipment. Firefighting lasted over six hours, which does not establish a service-outage duration. Charges against two suspects were formulated on 7 October and EAWs issued on 10 October; arrests in Germany took place on 12 October and German remand on 13 October. Transfer to Poland remains in progress. Evidence-gathering measures concerning two further people do not confirm their arrest. ABW also disclosed a separately detained person independently reconnoitring the station, remanded for three months from 30 September. This does not establish a third arsonist. The statement describes investigation of possible commissioning parties; it neither replaces the minister’s earlier attribution nor constitutes a verdict.
Der Spiegel on 17 October, according to the complete reports in The Insider and Euronews, raised possible involvement of the Turkish Daltons/Daltonlar group: the two detainees reportedly belonged to the group or acted on its instructions. This is a journalistic lead about intermediaries, not new arrests or a court finding. Both reports rely on the same material and are not independent confirmations. The earlier official attribution to Russian services remains a separate basis; the newly described commissioning chain is not officially confirmed. Conflicting secondary reports of three or four arrests in the arson case were not adopted.
On 29 October, Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau deputy head Saulius Briginas described direct links between people and Starlink incidents in Poland, Bulgaria and Lithuania. He said the Polish perpetrators were different from the two suspects in the Lithuanian and Bulgarian cases. His reference to at least four detainees in the Polish strand is a Lithuanian official’s account, without clarification of identities or the scope of detention. It does not replace the earlier Polish-German chronology or turn measures involving the woman in Karlsruhe into a confirmed arrest. The existing state attribution of the Polish sabotage remains a separate basis and does not automatically attribute the other two acts.
Rzeczpospolita / 2026-09-25 / secondary source
supports: the record, that it happened, the date, the location, the impact, the attribution
Malcontent / Google My Maps / secondary source
supports: the location
Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji / 2026-10-12 / primary source
supports: the record, the attribution
SWR / 2026-10-13 / secondary source
supports: the record
Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego / 2026-10-16 / primary source
supports: the record, that it happened, the date, the attribution
The Insider / 2026-10-17 / secondary source
supports: the record, the attribution
Euronews / 2026-10-17 / secondary source
supports: the record, the attribution
LRT / 2026-10-29 / secondary source
supports: the record, the attribution, the impact