Someone gained unauthorised access to the control system of the dam at Risavatnet and opened a valve for just under four hours. About 497 litres per second were released above the required minimum; no consequences beyond exceeding the minimum flow were recorded. The date recorded here is the day the open valve was found, 7 April; the source used does not establish when the valve was opened. Norway's NSM was notified on 10 April and the case became public in June.
Responsibility and limits of the evidence
suspected
Someone has named a perpetrator, but this is neither a court finding nor a formal attribution by a state.
Named party: pro-Russian hacker group
C - official suspicion
Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste (PST) / 2025-08-13 / carrying out the act
The Norwegian security service concluded that a pro-Russian hacker group was behind the attack and described it as a demonstration of capability. PST points to links between people in that group and Russian state actors, which is not the same as establishing that the attack was ordered at state level.
Impact
killed
not established
injured
not established
damage
not established
No casualties reported.
Source discrepancy
The day of discovery is recorded. Accounts mention that a video of the control panel was posted on Telegram on the same day as the attack, which could fix the day of the act, but the primary source used does not settle it.
What happened next
The criminal case was closed because no perpetrators were identified. PST maintains its assessment of the group, but the closure means no individuals were established.