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How firmly the event is tied to an actor. Grades A to D are explained on the about page.
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About the project
Drones, sabotage and airspace incidents
Borderline is a register of security incidents in NATO countries and Moldova examined in the context of Russia's war against Ukraine, plus observations in Jersey: 11 types of event, from airspace violations to sabotage, arson and cyberattacks with physical effects. This is not a list of Russian attacks. We record separately what happened, and who named a perpetrator on what basis.
The register holds 322 events from 24 February 2022 to 5 November 2026. Below: what it covers, what counts as one event, where the information comes from, how we assess responsibility and how precise the locations are.
On 5 November Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW) disclosed an investigation into a group suspected of working for Russian intelligence and supplying Russia with components for ammunition and weapons. Officers searched 21 locations across three provinces between 21 October and 2 November. Six people were detained. Four faced espionage charges and were remanded in custody for three months. The other two were placed under non-custodial measures. The entry is dated to public disclosure. The timing of the alleged deliveries is unknown. Exact coordinates are undetermined; the entry has no map point.
date found, not date of flight
reconnaissance and preparation
suspected. Someone has named a perpetrator, but this is neither a court finding nor a formal attribution by a state.
Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego / 2026-11-05: ABW alleges that the group worked for Russian intelligence. The investigation is ongoing.
On 4 November at 04:23 local time a drone entered Moldova from the direction of Zahnitkiv in Ukraine’s Odesa region, heading towards Camenca. At 04:25 it left near Vărăncău towards Ukraine’s Vinnytsia region. Moldova’s Air Operations Centre recorded one flight during Russian attacks on Ukraine. The model and operator remain unknown. Exact coordinates are undetermined; the entry has no map point.
airspace incident
unresolved. The case was looked at and not settled, or the findings are disputed or have been rejected.
On 3 November NBS issued an alert in Balvi and Ludza municipalities from 00:10 until 00:35 local time. NATO air-policing jets were also activated. LSM reported 00:07-00:33. The location and consequences of the possible crash remain unknown. There is no single point on the map because the sources describe an area. Latvian interceptors were launched from two separate positions. The initial visual assessment found that the target resembled drones used by Ukrainian forces. NBS reported a search following a possible crash in Balvi municipality. The type, origin and payload remained unknown.
airspace incident
unresolved. The case was looked at and not settled, or the findings are disputed or have been rejected.
2026-11-03: Latvian interceptors were launched from two separate positions. The initial visual assessment found that the target resembled drones used by Ukrainian forces. NBS reported a search following a possible crash in Balvi municipality. The type, origin and payload remained unknown.
On 2 November 2026 police, acting on KAPO’s recommendation, expelled Russian citizen Leonid Karabeshkin and imposed a Schengen entry ban. KAPO spokesperson Marta Tuul, quoted by ERR, said he maintained contacts with Russian intelligence services and people working on their behalf and shared information about Estonia’s Russian-speaking population. KAPO described the activity as systematic. The entry dates the confirmed expulsion and disclosure, not the start of the alleged activity. This is an administrative decision, without an espionage conviction or a finding of sabotage. No specific Russian agency or public proof of tasking for a particular operation was identified. Claims about contacts and sharing information are attributed to KAPO; grade C does not establish guilt in court. Exact coordinates are undetermined; the entry has no map point.
reconnaissance and preparation
suspected. Someone has named a perpetrator, but this is neither a court finding nor a formal attribution by a state.
Kaitsepolitseiamet, spokesperson Marta Tuul, via ERR / 2026-11-02: KAPO alleges contacts with Russian intelligence services and sharing information. No specific service or proof of tasking for a particular operation was identified; there is no judgment.
On the evening of 1 November a drone crossed eastern Latvia. An NBS officer reported that it entered from Belarus. At 19:16 it left Latvia for Russia. At 19:19 the military activated the self-destruct mechanism on its own BLAZE interceptor. The alert ended at 19:30. There is no single point on the map because the sources describe an area. After analysing sensor and interceptor data and consulting Ukrainian partners, Latvia’s armed forces assessed that the target was most likely a Russian Geran-type drone. Its explosive payload remained unknown.
airspace incident
unresolved. The case was looked at and not settled, or the findings are disputed or have been rejected.
Nacionālie bruņotie spēki / 2026-11-03: probably a Russian Geran-type drone (NBS assessment)
2026-11-03: After analysing sensor and interceptor data and consulting Ukrainian partners, Latvia’s armed forces assessed that the target was most likely a Russian Geran-type drone. Its explosive payload remained unknown.